The Civil War was a violent conflict. Arguably the nadir of this was May of 1864, particularly in Virginia and this was the beginning of the end of the Confederacy. U.S. Grant would demonstrate his bulldog trait and would lock horns with Robert E. Lee’s army and get in a fight to the death. By the end of May 1864 both armies were exhausted and would normally have pulled back to rest and refit. That was not true under Grant and this all began in an area of Virginia known as the Wilderness.
U.S. Grant devised a four pronged offensive that would occur simultaneously beginning in early May. The major elements would be Grant’s drive against Lee and William T. Sherman’s campaign against Atlanta. It also included Benjamin Butler’s campaign against Richmond via the James River and Franz Sigel’s attack up the Shenandoah Valley. All that was needed was for one to succeed and victory in the war would be within sight.
Grant had taken control of all armies but would let George Meade control the Army of the Potomac. Grant would just make strategic direction. Meade would be joined by Ambrose Burnside and his IX Corps, which would not officially become a part of the Army of the Potomac. Burnside was higher in rank than Meade and therefore would be entitled to command the army. He had of course already been in command and had been removed following the disaster of Fredericksburg. Burnside was of course well aware of this and wanted no part of army command and made this known to Grant but despite that Burnside remained in an independent command.
Lee knew that Grant was coming. Lee knew that Grant had more men, more material and more cannon so he sought a way to neutralize this and decided he wanted to draw Grant into the Wilderness, or the same place that he had fought Joseph Hooker the previous May. The forest had been cut down by early settlers but had regrown back into an entangled mess of growth that could easily disorient anyone. This would also nullify the Union’s massive advantage in artillery. Grant’s forces crossed the Rapidan River on May 4 and were heading for the Wilderness Tavern. He did not want to fight in the Wilderness and wanted to move through it as quickly as possible but Lee vowed not let that happen.
Grant believed that the army could move quickly but the supply trains were slow and cumbersome and slowed the march and it forced the army to camp for the night near the Wilderness Tavern. Meade’s cavalry proved inadequate and did not detect Lee’s approach. Grant had also assumed that Lee would not be able to react in time and this was a mistake that Grant would come to rue.
Grant was bringing 120,000 men into battle. Lee had about 65,000 men and some of them, James Longstreet’s Corps, had not yet arrived in the area. Nevertheless Lee marched his army west to meet the foe. Longstreet was on his way and if he arrived undetected he could potentially deliver a devastating flank attack the same way Stonewall Jackson had done at Chancellorsville the year prior. The underbrush prevented their discovery as Meade had dispatched his cavalry away to deal with a perceived threat elsewhere.
May 5
On the morning of May 5 Gouverneur Warren’s V Corps was marching toward the Plank Road when Richard Ewell’s Corps appeared. Grant was notified and replied with instructions to attack if the opportunity presented itself. Believing the Confederates to be an isolated force Warren moved to attack immediately. In actuality Ewell’s men were well positioned on high ground with clear fields of fire and field works. Warren’s generals figured this out and requested a delay so that John Sedgewick’s VI Corps could come up on their right and protect their flank.
Meade was growing frustrated with Warren and at 1 PM ordered him to attack. In some places the attack was ripped to shreds. In others the Union attack broke the Confederate line but lacked the punch to finish the job. The vaunted Iron Brigade, filled mostly by new recruits to make up for losses at Gettysburg, broke and ran for the first time in it’s history. Warren moved artillery forward to cover the attack but the Confederates captured it. The fighting was fierce and Saunder’s Field caught fire and those who were unable to escape burned to death.
Lee’s other corps was not as lucky. A.P. Hill’s approach was detected near the Chewning Farm and Meade ordered Union troops up to defend the intersections of the Orange Plank Road and Brock Road. Hill’s men were delayed by Union cavalry and Union infantry from the VI Corps under George Getty arrived just before Hill did. Smoke began to fill the air and visibility was reduced to nil. The fighting became a soldier’s fight with little command and control exercised.
Lee established his headquarters on the farm of the Widow Tapp. In the confusion of battle a few disoriented Union soldiers approached the farm. Both parties were surprised by the encounter and Lee and two generals ran for cover when the Union soldiers opened fire and were unharmed. The Union soldiers ran back into the woods. Imagine for a second if one of them had shot true.
With the fighting heating up Winfield Hancock’s II Corps was ordered into the fight. Hancock became bogged down by the divisions of Henry Heth and eventually Lee’s last remaining reserve under Cadmus Wilcox. Nightfall ended the fighting here with no advantage gained.
Grant believed that Hill’s Corps was a spent force and wanted an early morning assault by Hancock along with Getty. Warren and Sedgewick would continue to assault Ewell to prevent his men moving to aid Hill. Burnside would maneuver to get into Hill’s rear. If all went well Hill’s Corps would cease to exist after May 6.
May 6
Hancock began his assault at 5 AM and began to press Hill. Warren and Sedgewick attacked around the same time and Ewell had all he could handle so reinforcements could not be sent to either of them. Confederate regiments began to break and run and as Union infantry approached the Tapp Farm and Confederate artillery did its best to hold them back. A total collapse was imminent.
But yet, as Lee had managed at so many battles, the fortunes of war smiled on him. At 6 AM Longstreet’s lead elements, the Texas Brigade arrived on the field. The Texas brigade was small, only about 800 men but they were fresh and ready for battle. Lee prepared to lead them into battle himself but they refused to go. “Lee to the rear” they called and refused to move until he went to safety. Longstreet’s men were coming up and he counterattacked with vengeance. The Union attackers were disorganized and were driven back and the Confederate line stabilized.
For Longstreet the assault was not over. One of his staff officers found an old railroad bed that would potentially allow an assaulting force to get close to Hancock’s left undetected. Four brigades that had just arrived were sent this way and attacked at 11 AM. Hancock’s flank disappeared and his men were forced back to the Brock Road. Longstreet rode forward to observe. Some Virginians in the woods nearby believed that his party was a Federal force and opened fire on it. Longstreet was hit in the neck and one of his brigade commanders, Micah Jenkins, was killed. Shades of Chancellorsville all over again.
Charles Field now assumed Longstreet’s place and was told to press Hancock. The time that elapsed following the wounding had allowed Hancock time to restore his line behind earthworks. The fighting here now settled down and a great Confederate opportunity was gone.
Over on the left one of Ewell’s brigade commanders, John Gordon, began scouting the Union line to find a vulnerability. He wanted to make a flank attack and believed that he could but was turned down by his commanding officer Jubal Early. At some point in the day his plan was approved (Gordon claims that Lee personally approved it but Gordon wrote a self-serving memoir after the war) and went forward just before dark.
His attack was vicious and struck some of the least experienced troops in the Union army. These soldiers were in heavy artillery regiments that had manned the Washington defenses. They had only been just been converted to infantry to help supplement Grant’s numbers. Gordon rolled up the Union flank but darkness brought an end to the assault allowing the Union forces to stabilize the situation and eventually the Union line was extended passing the danger.
At Union HQ at the nearby Ellwood Mansion was alarmed by Gordon’s attacks. Lee was in their heads. One staff officer claimed that Lee would put his entire army between the river and cut off their retreat. Grant was calmly whittling and was not phased. What followed may be his most quoted line of the war: “Oh, I am heartily tired of hearing about what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to think he is suddenly going to turn a double somersault, and land in our rear and on both of our flanks at the same time. Go back to your command, and try to think what we are going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do.” That was what Grant brought to the Army of the Potomac.
May 7
Attacking strong Confederate earthworks was not something that Grant wanted to do. So he decided to maneuver instead. Rather than retreating like the army had done so many times before they would continue on. His army could follow the Brock Road to Spotsylvania Court House and if he could get in between Lee and Richmond he could fight on ground of his choosing. During the day sporadic fighting continued but did little damage to either side. As darkness fell Grant put his army in motion again.
The Wilderness was one of the most horrific battles of the war. The forest caught fire during the fighting and many wounded burned to death. Friendly fire was common and units were easily disoriented. Lee scored a tactical victory but Grant won a strategic one but for both sides the losses were heavy, Grant lost about 17,500 men and Lee lost about 10,000 men. Grant could afford the losses, Lee could not. There is no accurate totaling of casualties as the campaign continued almost immediately at Spotsylvania. Estimates can vary, sometimes wildly. The battlefield itself is a part of the Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park.
