The World Needs More Kevin

At Cedar Mountain Stonewall Jackson had stopped John Pope’s offensive in Virginia. Jackson moved to trap Pope between the Rapidan and Rappahannock River but was unable to do so since Pope smelled a trap and maneuvered away. To finish Pope off Jackson needed more men and with George McClellan’s army on the Peninsula showing no signs of movement Robert E. Lee decided he could move his army to help Jackson.

Jackson had managed to get into Pope’s rear and destroyed his supply depot at Bristoe Station on the night of August 26. When Pope learned of this he put his army into motion to find Jackson. Confederate soldiers had the feast of their lives and Pope’s dress uniform was taken. What could not be taken was burned. On the night of August 27 Jackson took position near the old battlefield in an unfinished railroad cut to await both Lee and Pope.

Lee was on his way. Longstreet’s wing of the army cleared Federal resistance at Thoroughfare Gap on August 28 and the road between Lee and Jackson. Jackson wanted to draw Pope into battle and he got his chance on the night of the 28th. Rufus King’s division of Federal soldiers were marching eastward on the Warrenton Turnpike toward Centreville and despite the late hour of the day Jackson moved to attack.

The Union troops moved to defend themselves and took position on the Brawner Farm. Fighting began at about 6:30 PM and the two lines simply shot at each other from about 80 yards. The Union soldiers were for the most part green soldiers but they stood their ground and gave as good as they got. The fighting was heaviest around the unit that would soon be given the name Iron Brigade. Reinforcements arrived for both sides but darkness made coordination difficult. Casualties were high on both sides but the battle was now underway.

Pope had now found Jackson but mistakenly believed that he was in retreat and moved his army in to capture him. He could not have been more wrong. Jackson was not going anywhere and instead wanted Pope to attack him, knowing that help was coming. Pope assumed that his forces were positioned to cut off Jackson’s retreat, which they weren’t. These assumptions would lead to disaster for Pope.

On August 29 Pope moved about 20,000 men into position to assault Jackson along the Stony Ridge. Jackson saw the buildup and sent A.P. Hill to the left to secure his flank. This ground was unsuitable for artillery and it was heavily wooded. Richard Ewell’s Division held most of the rest of the line.

Pope was beginning to receive reinforcements from McClellan with Fitz-John Porter’s V Corps. Porter and McClellan were friends and Porter resented Pope. He did not want to see him achieve any glory when McClellan couldn’t. Porter was ordered to attack what Pope thought was Jackson’s right when he arrived on the field. Franz Sigel, who was on the field, would attack Jackson’s left. Attacks began at 7 AM. The assaults made little headway as they were uncoordinated and lacked punch. As a result Jackson’s men, protected by the unfinished railroad embankment, pushed them back easily.

Another assault at 10 AM failed. Supporting forces failed to engage and just simply fell back. Pope’s plan was failing and he was not yet present to control events (not that it would have helped). He arrived on the field at 1 PM expecting to see the culmination of the battle but instead found his attacks had been pushed back. More reinforcements from McClellan were arriving but Pope assumed that McClellan would be arriving shortly with the rest of his army and he considered stopping the fight and falling back but worried about the fallout.

Now Pope got some good news, his other corps under Irvin McDowell was nearing the field. But there was bad news as well, Longstreet’s men were beginning to arrive. Pope now sent a message to both Porter and McDowell to tell them what to do. The orders were unclear and contradictory and there was no actual direction in the message. Pope wanted them to move and attack Jackson’s right but they were nowhere near there.

By mid-afternoon Lee arrived on the field. He wanted Longstreet to make an immediate assault on Pope but Longstreet observed Federal troops south of the Warrenton Turnpike that overlapped his line. Longstreet wanted to wait and Lee relented when his cavalry chief J.E.B. Stuart told him that was Porter and McDowell’s men arriving.

Pope, who believed that his reinforcements would arrive momentarily ordered another attack at 3 PM. On Jackson’s left Phil Kearney’s Federal division managed to get a toehold in Jackson’s line but was pushed back after hand-to-hand combat. Otherwise it was more of the same. But Pope was now pulling men from south of the Turnpike to aid in the assault.

Pope was now getting impatient. He sent an explicit order to Porter at 4:30 to attack but his messenger got lost and did not deliver it until 6:30. At 5 PM another assault went forward. Again Kearney made headway and drove Confederate defenders away but a counterattack again forced Kearney back. Pope continued to pull men from south of the Turnpike unaware of Longstreet’s presence there.

Longstreet requested to make a reconnaissance in force toward Chinn Ridge and John Hood’s Division was moved forward. McDowell was made aware of this movement and told Pope about it and asked to leave the division that had fought at Brawner’s Farm to intercept it. Pope did not like the man who commanded the division and wanted to send them elsewhere but Hood’s movement forced the issue. Hood pushed these troops and those remaining south of the Turnpike back and took Chinn Ridge but Lee recalled them. Pope was now aware that Longstreet was on the field but once again made a bad interpretation of information. Pope convinced himself that Longstreet was only here to cover Jackson’s retreat and Hood pulling back only reinforced that.

Pope now called up Porter to resume the offensive the next day. His hopeful reinforcements from McClellan would not be forthcoming. as they had not advanced past Alexandria and McClellan himself did not want to help Pope.

At 3 AM on August 30 the last of Longstreet’s men arrived on the field. They halted for the night in an isolated position and when dawn broke they pulled back to the main Confederate line. This again reinforced Pope’s beliefs. He directed McDowell to move to hit Jackson’s right hoping to catch them while withdrawing. McDowell protested and Samuel Heintzelman’s III Corps was sent instead. Pope convened a council of war and his generals recommended caution. Probing attacks found Jackson still in position and reports were now coming in that the Confederates were south of the Turnpike in heavy force. Porter concurred with his those reports but both McDowell and Heintzelman sent out scouts who failed to find anything on their fronts so Pope resolved to attack the retreating Southerners.

Porter was to attack along the Turnpike with 10,000 men. It took two hours to get into position. The Confederates attempted to break up the movement with an attack but it was hurled back by Union artillery and Porter began the attack. His men had to cross hundreds of yards of open of ground against an protected enemy. It was doomed from the start and took heavy losses near what became known as the Deep Cut. With losses mounting more Union troops were taken from south of the Turnpike. Now it was time for Longstreet to attack.

Only 2,200 Union soldiers were now south of the Turnpike. Longstreet was attacking with over 25,000 men. Only two Union brigades, Nathaniel McLean’s and Gouverneur Warren’s were in place. The assault began around 4 PM and within 10 minutes Warren’s brigade was being overwhelmed. The 5th New York lost 300 men in 10 minutes with 120 being killed or mortally wounded, the largest loss of life of any infantry regiment in any battle during the war.

Pope was oblivious to what was going on. He had just been given a message that the last of McClellan’s men were being sent to him and that McClellan himself was ordered to remain in Washington. His relief did not last long before word reached him about what was going on. He ordered some of his men to disengage to move to help. John Reynolds’ division on Chinn Ridge was in place and preparing for the attack but now with Porter’s men on the run McDowell ordered them to shore that line up. Reynolds protested and some of his men had even come into contact with Hood’s Division and had stopped their attack cold for a few minutes before being overrun.

Longstreet’s attack was crumbling Union resistance. Union troops were fleeing back to Henry Hill and were nothing more than a mob. James Ricketts’ division took position on Chinn Ridge and briefly stabilized the situation but by now there was no hope and it was only a matter of time until the Confederates were in command of the field. McDowell formed a new line on Henry Hill while the rest of the army crossed Bull Run to safety. Longstreet committed his last reserves and at 6 PM Jackson joined in the assault but the position on Henry Hill was too strong.

At 8 PM Pope ordered a withdraw, which unlike the first battle here was orderly. Lee’s men were too tired to pursue. A brief cavalry pursuit took place but Federal cavalry blocked it near the estate called Portici. Pope escaped.

Casualties were high for the Union. Pope lost about 14,500 men out of his 62,000 man army. Confederate casualties were a bit less, about 6,200 out of 50,000 men. Lee was emboldened by another success and he resolved now to take a chance and invade the North hoping to end the war. Pope would be relieved of command two weeks later (with McClellan restored) and sent west to Minnesota to fight the Sioux. He remained bitter and had Fitz-John Porter arrested and court-martialed for his actions. Porter was found guilty and dismissed and spent the rest of his life fighting the charges. A special commission later exonerated him, using Longstreet himself as a witness, and his sentence was reversed.

Much of the battlefield is preserved as Manassan National Battlefield.