The summer of 1863 was devastating for the Confederacy. Lee was defeated at Gettysburg with huge irreplaceable losses. U.S. Grant and Nathaniel Banks took control of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, Louisiana respectively putting the Mississippi River firmly in Federal control. In Tennessee William Rosecrans maneuvered Braxton Bragg out of Tennessee in a near-bloodless campaign. For the Confederates this army was the only one intact and a victory would need to come from this quarter.
Rosecrans had captured the rail junction of Chattanooga but he was not finished. He hoped to advance on Atlanta and seize that city as well. He believed that Bragg was on the run and his Army of the Cumberland, 60,000 strong could finish the job. Bragg however was not on the run, but he was in retreat. He moved his army out of Alabama and into Georgia hoping that Rosecrans would attack him since he was outnumbered all the while utlizing the northern Georgia terrain which was ideal for defense. That was until he realized that Rosecrans made a serious error. To speed up pursuit he divided his army into three columns and a large gap separated his westernmost column from the center. Bragg saw an opportunity to strike a blow and halted his Army of Tennessee. Jefferson Davis saw an opportunity as well and put two divisions in motion from Virginia under James Longstreet. Fighting was not expected in the fall months in Virginia as both sides were still licking their wounds from Gettysburg. Bragg also received reinforcements from East Tennessee under Simon Buckner swelling Bragg’s ranks to over 70,000 men and more were coming from Mississippi under John Breckenridge.
Rosecrans moved into Alabama and Georgia in early September. This part of Alabama and Georgia is barren with poor roads, necessitating the different routes. Rosecrans did not want to be attacked as he could be pushed back up against the mountains but he could not stay put as Washington was applying pressure to him. The War Department had also sent an observer, Charles Dana, to keep an eye on him. so he needed to move south quickly. Rosecrans believed that Bragg was fleeing toward Rome or Dalton but instead was at LaFayette. Acting on this bad assumption the lead division of George Thomas’ corps under James Negley entered into McLemore’s Cove, a small valley surrounded by mountains. Absalom Baird’s division was 12 hours behind. Negley was isolated and ran into Confederate skirmishers and placed his men at the mouth of the cove. It was well that he did. Bragg sent two divisions to fight but the commander, Thomas Hindman, was also cautious and put off attack. More reinforcements arrived on September 10 giving them a 3:1 advantage but still no attack was made. This allowed Federal support to arrive and later allowed for time for the force to fall back, which they did at 3 AM on September 11.
Rosecrans knew that he had been lucky and began to concentrate his army on September 12. His other two corps under Alexander McCook and Thomas Crittenden began moving toward Steven’s Gap and Thomas. Bragg was becoming more aggressive and he ordered an attack on another of Rosecrans’ divisions near Lookout Mountain but once again his commanders were slow and allowed the advantage to pass. Rosecrans army was now concentrating at Lee and Gordon’s Mills. Bragg held a council of war on September 15 and his generals urged an offensive toward Chattanooga. He began moving his army on September 18. Longstreet was on his way and his confidence was up. Rosecrans would be forced to fight or retreat and if he chose to fight Bragg would have the advantage in numbers.
His plan was simple. His army would move west beyond Lee and Gordon’s Mills and cross Chickamauga Creek using two bridges and two fords. Rosecrans would either be forced back into McLemore’s Cove or back into Chattanooga. The two fords were open but the two bridges were guarded by Union cavalry.
September 18
Bushrod Johnson’s Division was to take Reed’s Bridge and William Walker’s Reserve Corps was to take Alexander’s Bridge. Reed’s Bridge was guarded by Robert Minty’s cavalry brigade and Alexander’s Bridge was guarded by John Wilder’s “Lightning” Brigade. Wilder’s men were mounted infantry and were armed with Spencer repeating rifles, giving them superior firepower.
The fighting began at 7 AM and eventually Confederate numbers forced Minty to retreat and he was unable to destroy the bridge. Wilder held out but was eventually flanked out of his position at 4:30 PM when Walker found an unguarded ford about one mile away. Bragg had achieved surprise but his timetable was well behind schedule as his other forces were also slow in crossing the creek. There was one positive, Longstreet’s lead division under John Bell Hood arrived at Catoosa at 4:30 PM and was on his way to the battlefield.
September 19
When the sun rose the Union army was scattered. George Thomas XIV Corps was on the left flank. Thomas Crittenden’s XXI Corps was near Lee and Gordon’s Mills. Alexander McCook’s XX Corps was behind the lines and Gordon Granger’s Reserve Corps was to the north. Bragg’s battleplan for the morning called for a strike at Lee and Gordon’s Mills, which he believed to be the left flank of the army. He was wrong. Walker’s Reserve Corps and Leonidas Polk’s Corps would move to cut off the Union army from Chattanooga while Buckner, Hood and D.H. Hill’s Corps held Rosecrans in place.
The battle though opened by accident. Daniel McCook’s brigade from Granger’s corps had been moved south to help Minty the day before. McCook sent a regiment to try to destroy the bridge and ran into Confederates near Jay’s Mill. The regiment was driven back and McCook received orders to report back to Granger. Before marching back McCook ran into Thomas and reported that a lone Confederate brigade was in the woods and that they were trapped on this side of the creek. Thomas decided to bag it. John Brannan’s division was sent forward and bit off more than they could chew.
Nathan Bedford Forrest commanded the cavalry near Jay’s Mill and he was not about to be taken prisoner. He called for help and put his men in line. Confederate infantry arrived but was not in sufficient strength to drive back Brannan, who’s ammunition was now running low. Absalom Baird’s division was now moved in and began to drive Forrest back. Bragg now sensed that his picture of the battlefield may not have been right. He ordered St. John Liddell’s Division across Alexander’s Bridge and they hit Baird in the flank. While Baird’s men recovered and halted Lidell near the Winfrey Field the battle was heating up.
Benjamin Cheatham’s Division was now moved north and entered the fray at 11 AM and began driving the Union troops back. Richard Johnson’s Union division was sent by McCook and was in place along the LaFayette Road and they stopped Cheatham’s attack. John Palmer’s Union division was sent by Crittenden and ran into Cheatham in the Brock Field and drove the Confederates back. A.P. Stewart’s Division was sent into battle by Buckner around noon and attacked at the Brotherton Farm. They drove the Federal soldiers there back and eventually shattered Horatio Van Cleve’s Division there at 3:30 PM. Some of Hood’s men also joined in the attack. A Federal brigade under John Turchin held the Confederates back but was eventually forced back. Despite making a major penetration into the Federal line the Confederates were isolated and recalled.
At 2 PM Hood’s remaining forces found Jefferson Davis’ Federal division coming onto the field. Bushrod Johnson attacked and forced Davis across the LaFayette Road. The Union troops were routed but the attack stalled when Wilder’s men came back into the battle in the Viniard Field. More Union reinforcements were on the way when Thomas Wood’s division arrived at 3 PM and took position in the Viniard Field. Hood’s men attacked these newcomers and drove them back but again Wilder’s men held firm. This attack came close to Rosecrans’ HQ in the Widow Glenn’s home.
Throughout the afternoon the Union launched several counterattacks to reclaim the ground that was lost. The LaFayette Road was also their lifeline back to Chattanooga and they could not afford to lose control of it. Most of the attacks were driven back, with particularly heavy casualties in the Viniard Field. With the northern end of the battlefield quiet and with daylight running out Bragg tried one last movement to cut the Federals off. Patrick Cleburne’s Division was sent to help Polk make a final attack for the day but the only problem was that George Thomas was not sitting on his hands. He had pulled his men back into a more defensible position. Cleburne did take possession of the Winfrey Field driving Baird back but his attack on Thomas’ line was a debacle in the twilight and was repulsed with heavy losses.
Bragg was pleased with the day’s fighting and he met with his senior generals individually to announce that he was reorganizing the army with the arrival of James Longstreet. Polk and Longstreet would command wings of the army. Polk would command D.H. Hill’s Corps, Walker’s Corps and Cheatham’s Division while Longstreet would take Hood’s Corps, Buckner’s Corps and Thomas Hindman’s Division. It was certainly unusual to do something like this in the midst of a battle and to place officers under someone in those circumstances was asking for trouble but at this point Bragg had too many senior generals with egos. Hill, who held the rank of lieutenant general which was the same as Longstreet and Polk, was not happy and to rub salt in his wound he was informed by a staff officer rather than the commanding general. Longstreet himself was unable to find Bragg until 11 PM when he finally found his headquarters after nearly running into the Federal lines.
The problem for Hill was that he did not learn what his role was for the following day. A courier was sent but was not able to find him. Hill was expected to begin the battle at 5 AM by sending John Breckenridge’s Division forward. Breckenridge himself was at Polk’s HQ but no one told him any of this either.
Rosecrans himself was not sitting idly by either but he and his army were exhausted. Rosecrans himself was a workaholic and typically got only a few hours of sleep per night while campaigning. He also like to talk with his staff about anything but particularly Catholicism for which he had a zeal and he did it until the wee hours of the morning. On this night Rosecrans was bleary-eyed. He called a council of war and his generals wanted to stay and fight. Thomas, who drifted in and out of sleep kept telling him he needed to reinforce the left. With Charles Dana present retreating was not an option and though his army had been hit hard he was reminded of Perryville and Stone’s River where Bragg retreated and he probably expected the same thing to happen.
Thomas’ men were positioned around the Kelly Farm and had built field entrenchments. Their line was strong but was vulnerable to a flanking attack from the north. McCook pulled back from the Viniard Field and formed up near the Widow Glenn’s Cabin. Crittenden was moved into reserve and Granger was put on notice to be ready to move at a moment’s notice. Rosecrans had only five brigades that had not fought the day before but he was not leaving.
September 20
In the cold, early morning hours Braxton Bragg expected to hear fighting. There was none. So did Polk. He found Hill, who was not even close to being ready to attack, unaware that he was supposed to. Polk issued new orders. Hill called for a delay. His men needed to eat breakfast and he needed to recon the Federal line. Bragg reluctantly agreed to delay the attack. The plan was for an en echelon attack that was designed to drive Rosecrans south away from Chattanooga and Hill’s men were the first to go in so Bragg had little choice.
Thomas wanted his line to stretch to the McFarland’s Gap Road to the north but could not weaken his line any further. He called on Rosecrans for reinforcements and James Negley’s division was to be sent but when the sun came up they were still in line. Rosecrans himself found Negley still in line and got his men moving. Negley was replaced in line by Thomas Wood’s division. As Negley began marching the fighting began. It was 9:30 AM.
Breckenridge was the first to attack. One of his brigades under Benjamin Helm hit Thomas’ works and was repulsed with heavy losses and Helm himself was mortally wounded in the attack. This was a huge loss for both sides as Helm was married to one of Mary Todd Lincoln’s sisters. He was one of two generals in the Confederate army that you did not say something bad about Abraham Lincoln in front of (George Pickett was the other). Two of Breckenridge’s brigades did find the Thomas’ flank and positioned themselves along the LaFayette Road to drive Thomas south. Thomas called on reinforcements, including the lead elements of Negley’s division and drove them back reopening the LaFayette Road.
All along Thomas’ front the Confederate attacks bogged down. Casualties were mounting and outside of Breckenridge they had made no headway. The fighting here ended around noon. Thomas though still wanted help and sought it from anyone who could give it. Brannan’s division was next to be sent. Thomas’ staff believed it was already in motion and sought someone to fill the gap their departure would have created but Brannan was waiting for approval from Rosecrans to move. Rosecrans’ chief of staff James Garfield knew that Brannan had not moved but was busy with other tasks. A senior aide was called to write the order to Wood, who was to replace Brannan, but issued an unclear order. Rosecrans himself never checked it, he was at this point exhausted and overcome with fatigue.
Wood did not know what to make of the order. He received the order just before 11 AM but he knew that Brannan was still in line. His only option to fulfill the order was to pull out of line and move into support behind Brannan. It was a risky move that made little sense but Wood had been berated earlier in the day for not promptly following an order when he was moved to replace Negley and did not want to incur his commander’s wrath again. Wood alerted McCook who agreed to fill the gap but his corps had been hit hard the day before and he did not know if he could fill the gap.
The timing of Wood moving out could not have been worse. In the woods just to their front was Longstreet’s Wing and it was now time for Longstreet’s men to go into action. A.P. Stewart’s Division went forward without orders and despite briefly taking control of the LaFayette Road they were pushed back by Brannan’s. Longstreet was surprised and delayed his attack. He wanted to put the men he brought with him from Virginia in the front lines and the movement took time. His plan was to stack eight brigades into five lines straddling the Brotherton Road. He would hit with irresistible force and punch a hole into the Union line that they could not recover from. The attack went forward at 11:10 AM.
Coincidentally this was the exact same time that Wood was pulling out and his men were pulling out at exactly the place that Longstreet was coming for. The shock was complete. Panic set in with the Union army. Crittenden hustled to set up a line of artillery that briefly delayed the attack in the Dyer Field before the Confederates captured most of the pieces. Wood sent his trailing brigade back to the fight and it also briefly stopped the Confederate attack. Hood’s old command was doing the fighting when Hood rode up and was hit in the right thigh. He was carried from the field and his right leg was amputated.
The Union troops were falling back to the Horseshoe Ridge and Union troops were able to stop Confederate momentum there. Hindman’s Division moved in but was stopped by Phil Sheridan’s division near a small knoll. One of his brigade commanders, William Lytle, was killed there and the hill bears his name today. The only remaining Union resistance on the southern end of the battlefield was Wilder’s brigade. With their Spencer repeaters they held their ground. Wilder considered making a charge into the exposed Confederate flank but Charles Dana, who had been napping and had awoken in the middle of the battle now came running to him. He said that the battle was lost and he demanded to be escorted to Chattanooga. Wilder had no choice but to do so.
Sheridan and Davis’ divisions left the field toward McFarland’s Gap. They were joined soon by Rosecrans, Garfield, McCook and Crittenden. Negley and Van Cleve’s divisions soon followed. Once they reached the gap they reorganized. Some wanted to return to the battle, after all Thomas was not there, he could still be fighting. Rosecrans told them no. He would return to Chattanooga to begin organizing the city’s defenses. Garfield though was sent back to tell Thomas to assume command and to retreat to Rossville.
Thomas was indeed still fighting. Thomas himself was a hated man as a native Virginian who had remained loyal. His sisters would refuse to even think of him for the remainder of their lives for betraying their state but George Thomas could not think of that now as he was now in the hottest fight of his life. He had two different parts of the line to control. His line in the Kelly Field was holding fast. He was also reforming what remained of the right along Horseshoe Ridge and Snodgrass Hill. A gap of nearly 3/4 of a mile in a thick woodlot separated the two lines creating an inviting gap and inviting disaster. Squads and companies of men were reforming and began constructing breastworks on the Horseshoe Ridge and reinforcements were coming. By 1 PM they had a strong line anchored by the 23rd Ohio and their 5 shot repeating rifles. The regiment brought 535 men into the battle and fired over 40,000 rounds in the defense of Snodgrass Hill.
Gordon Granger had grown tired of hearing fighting to the south and with only Confederate cavalry eying him he decided to move south. While he was ordered to be ready to move he never received orders to move. Despite this his timing could not have been better. He sent two brigades the three miles south to the battlefield and his men arrived just as Bushrod Johnson’s men were beginning to flank the Union position with his timely arrival forcing the attack back. Confederate attacks continued to be bogged down and repulsed and Bragg was losing confidence, especially in Polk. He had been in this situation before coming so close to victory but without being able to seal the victory. Longstreet called for reinforcements but Bragg believed that no one in Polk’s command had any fight left in them.
At 4:30 PM Longstreet deployed his last reserve, William Preston’s Division. Thomas knew that the game was up. His men were nearly out of ammunition and he issued orders to retreat. His men pulled off of Snodgrass Hill as Preston advanced up it. Unfortunately a few regiments were ordered to cover the retreat but did not have enough ammunition. These regiments were captured almost to a man. In the Kelly Field the Confederates advanced when they saw the Union soldiers pulling out and captured several hundred prisoners. The Confederates again briefly blocked the LaFayette Road near the McDonald Field but John Turchin’s brigade broke through. The way back to Chattanooga and safety was clear.
As darkness came both armies were tired and hungry. Rosecrans’ men slipped back into Chattanooga and Rosecrans himself was a beaten man. When Lincoln learned of the battle he tried to cheer Rosecrans up but he knew that he was lost. Bragg did not know that the Union army had left the field but his army was in no shape to follow. Many of the troops who had arrived during the battle by rail had gone ahead of their supply wagons. Bragg’s army lost many horses and when he did learn of Rosecrans’ withdraw this slowed his pursuit. He also lacked pontoon bridges to get across the wide Tennessee River. He did capture large quantities of ammunition on the battlefield.
The butcher’s bill was horrendous. Chickamauga was the second bloodiest battle of the war and one of the rare battles where the Confederates lost more men than the Union. Rosecrans lost about 16,200 men, with about 4,700 of them being captured. Bragg lost 18,500 men, losses that the Confederacy could ill afford. Bragg moved north to Chattanooga and occupied the heights south of town as Rosecrans had neglected to defend them. Things looked dire but there was one man who could salvage the situation and this would culminate in the battles around Chattanooga two months later.
Most of the battlefield is preserved as a part of Chickamagua and Chattanooga National Military Park, our nation’s first military park.
