If there was one battle that foreshadowed the fighting of World War I Spotsylvania Court House was it. Lines of infantry advanced shoulder to shoulder against entrenched enemy positions and were mowed down. New tactics had to be developed on the fly and the lessons of this battle were not learned even a half century later.
When Grant’s combined forces began pulling out of the Wilderness he had about 100,000 men. His objective was the crossroads near Spotsylvania Court House about 10 miles away where he could hopefully put himself between Richmond and Robert E. Lee’s army and force Lee to fight on ground of Grant’s choosing. Grant began moving on the night of May 7. The army itself was so used to retreating and licking their wounds and when they came to a road junction that went either north or south they cheered when they took the southern road.
The army would take two routes, the Brock Road and the Orange Plank Road. The cavalry under Phil Sheridan was sent ahead to clear those roads but it did not take long for them to run into Confederate cavalry and fighting near Todd’s Tavern lasted for much of May 7. Sheridan did not want to attack at night and put his men into bivouac instead. This created a huge traffic jam on the Brock Road and when Meade arrived at Todd’s Tavern and saw sleeping cavalrymen he was furious.
Grant had gotten the drop on Lee, who was unsure of Grant’s intentions. He was told that the pontoons had been removed from the river so Grant could be heading to Fredericksburg to the east or south towards Richmond. Spotsylvania Court House was valuable to him as he could intercept either movement at that location. Lee began to move his army by putting Richard Anderson, now in command of Longstreet’s Corps, in motion. Anderson had no indication that he needed to get to Spotsylvania at a certain time and he began marching at 10 PM on May 7 all the while being on the lookout for a good place to camp for the night. He wanted to get away from the battlefield never did find a suitable place to camp so his corps continued on and reached Spotsylvania. It was well for the Confederates that he did not stop.
May 8
In the morning of May 8 Sheridan attacked but was unable to dislodge Stuart’s troopers. Meade ordered the infantry in and finally pushed them out opening the road. Stuart fell back to a place called Laurel Hill and called for help from Anderson, who’s men were eating breakfast. Anderson sent two brigades and they arrived as Gouverneur Warren’s V Corps arrived on the field. Warren ordered an immediate attack believing only cavalry was in position but it was repulsed by the newly arrived infantrymen. Several attacks were made through the day as both sides fed more men in but Anderson held the ground. Union cavalry under James Wilson had been in position to flank the infantry off of Laurel Hill but Confederate infantry chased them away. Meade was not happy with his cavalry or his new cavalry chief’s performance.
Winfield Hancock’s II Corps took up a position along the Catharpin Road to protect the rear of the army near Todd’s Tavern. Jubal Early, now in command of A.P. Hill’s Corps due to Hill becoming sick, tried to test the defenses and pushed Union troops back to Todd’s Tavern but did not continue on. John Sedgewick’s VI Corps took position on Warren’s left. Another assault on Laurel Hill was tried and repulsed. Sedgewick then tried to get around Anderson’s flank but now ran into Richard Ewell’s Corps.
May 9
Over the night of May 8-9 the Confederates began erecting nearly 4 miles of earthworks along Laurel Hill with a small horseshoe shape bulge at its apex to follow the contours of the terrain. They continued south to near the court house. It was a strong position and made more formidable by Confederate engineers who created the position so that nearly every part of the line could provide enfilade fire to another part of the line. There was one weakness, the Mule Shoe as it came to be known. This was the salient in the line and nearly one mile long. The engineers were aware of the problem but the terrain necessitated it.
The Union troops were also constructing their own earthworks. When he was inspecting his men’s progress John Sedgewick found that many of them were taking cover when a Confederate sharpshooter would take shots at them. He told them that he was ashamed of them for taking cover because of one man and that “”they couldn’t hit an elephant at this distance.” He was then shot in the head and died instantly. Replacing Sedgewick was Horatio Wright, who had a solid but unspectacular resume.
Ambrose Burnside moved his IX Corps into position along the Fredericksburg Road. Hancock observed that the Confederates had pulled back from his front and Grant ordered him to attack the Confederate flank and drive them towards Burnside. Hancock advanced but found a bridge heavily defended and decided to wait until the following day to continue. Lee was aware of the danger Hancock posed to his flank and moved two divisions under William Mahone and Henry Heth to confront Hancock.
May 10
When morning came Hancock realized that he faced a significant force but Grant believed that the defenses had to have been weakened to counter Hancock’s threat and ordered an attack on all fronts at 5 PM. Hancock would leave one division behind and move to join the rest of the army. The division that was left behind under Francis Barlow was attacked at 2 PM and forced to withdraw. Hancock’s personal assistance was required to reform their lines.
Hancock’s men took up a position near Laurel Hill. Warren, who wanted to redeem himself from the debacle of two days before, wanted to attack. He went ahead at 4 PM and his attack was repulsed with heavy losses once again. Grant had to postpone the 5 PM attack so that Warren could reorganize his men.
At 6 PM the attack along the rest of the line went off. Leading Wright’s attack were 12 handpicked regiments led by young Colonel Emory Upton. The 5,000 men would advance in four lines and would not stop to fire but instead would cover the ground as quickly as possible and hit the Mule Shoe. The first line would break through and the supporting lines would then widen the breach. Gershom Mott’s division would be ready to follow. Their selection was a poor choice. Many of the men’s enlistments were about to expire so they were extremely gun-shy at this point. They had also taken heavy losses in the Wilderness that sapped their morale. The division would actually be disbanded in the coming days.
The attack encountered heavy Confederate fire but Upton’s men broke though in hand-t0-hand fighting. Lee and Ewell quickly organized a counterattack and Mott’s division was repulsed easily. With no support Upton had no choice but to retreat. This would be tried again later but in this instance Grant saw potential and Upton himself was promoted to brigadier general on the spot.
Burnside moved to attack and could very well have won the battle himself. Only one Confederate division under Cadmus Wilcox stood in his way but Burnside did not know this. This was because Phil Sheridan had grown tired of Meade’s grousing and requested that he be allowed to take his men and make trouble for Lee. Grant had approved it and no cavalry was available for scouting. When Burnside encountered Wilcox he stopped and ordered his men to entrench rather than continuing on. That night Grant believed that Burnside was isolated and ordered him to link up with Wright to secure the line. The advantage was lost.
May 11 and 12
Grant now began planning for another assault. He would use Upton’s plan and improve on it. His attack had failed not because of the attacking force but because of the lack of support. Hancock would move his corps up and attack with his whole force. Burnside would attack from his position as well. Warren and Wright would demonstrate against Laurel Hill to keep its defenders there.
Lee was unaware of this. His men heard the rumbling of wagons behind the line and took that to mean that Grant was on the move again. He had already tried to get around his right once and may be about to try it again. Needing to be mobile he ordered the artillery removed from the Mule Shoe so it could be put on the road quickly should Grant be found to be maneuvering again. He could not have made a worse decision.
In a torrential rain Hancock’s men took their places for the assault the next day. Their movements and preparations were heard but the defenders of the Mule Shoe could not tell if they were preparing for an attack or for a movement. Early in the morning of May 12 the Confederate commander in the Mule Shoe, Edward Johnson, requested his artillery back. It was too late.
Hancock’s men were scheduled to attack at 4 AM but it was still dark and rainy so he delayed the attack for 30 minutes. A thick mist and fog shielded the attacking force until it was on top of the defenders and Hancock’s men broke through easily. Johnson himself was captured along with one of his brigade commanders, George Steuart and most of his division. The rain had ruined most of the Confederate’s gunpowder and hand-to-hand fighting broke out. 15,000 men were crowded into the area and the Union attack became nothing more than a mob. No one knew what to do if the attack succeeded and no one could exert any control over it.
Confederate reinforcements were on the way and blocked the way for a further Union breakthrough. Lee himself was on scene and tried to lead his men in the defense but he was ushered to the rear as he had been at the Wilderness. Grant ordered reinforcements from Wright be sent against the Mule Shoe and Thomas Neill’s division moved in. In what might have been the heaviest fighting of the war the two sides sparred with each other from 6:30 AM until darkness at a place that became known as the Bloody Angle. Wounded drowned in the mud as the living fought on, sometimes just on the other side of the breastworks from their foe. An oak tree here was cut down not by axes but by bullets. The stump is a part of the Smithsonian collection in Washington DC today. The fighting here ended at midnight.
Warren once again moved to attack Laurel Hill but by now his men had no enthusiasm for the assault, which petered out within 30 minutes. Meade ordered another, which also failed miserably. On the other side Burnside’s assault became a stalemate. At 2 PM Grant ordered Burnside to renew the attack. Coincidentally Lee also ordered an attack in the same sector to drive Burnside’s artillery away. Burnside’s attack was hit in the flank and stopped and once again it bogged down.
Lee knew that his line had been breached and set his engineers to work on a new line to the rear. At 4 AM his exhausted men pulled back to that line leaving a scene of utter destruction. The landscape no longer existed. Bodies were piled up four to five deep in some places and the sights would haunt the survivors for the rest of their lives.
May 13-16
With another line of entrenchments in his way Grant was loathe to attack it. Now he decided to maneuver away from the battlefield and to the east. Warren and Wright would move their corps behind the lines and take position to Burnside’s left. They began the march on the night of May 13 in a torrential downpour which made for a slow go of it. Lee moved Anderson’s Corps to block him. Both sides were exhausted from nearly two weeks on marching and combat and Grant decided to refrain from another assault until the weather improved.
May 17-19
The weather cleared on May 17 and found much of Grant’s army concentrated along the Fredericksburg Road. Grant believed that Lee had moved to counter leaving much of his left exposed. Hancock would make an assault supported by Wright and Burnside to take advantage of that. But Ewell’s men were still there and had several days to improve their defenses. The assault was doomed and Ewell’s artillery alone repulsed the attack.
Grant now decided to move on. Hancock would march toward Fredericksburg and turn south. Grant hoped that Lee would take the bait and pursue this isolated corps and then he could follow up and destroy Lee’s army. Lee had other ideas. Ewell was ordered to conduct a reconnaissance to find the flank of the Union army. He did so at the Harris Farm. He found Union heavy artillery regiments there and moved to attack. Unlike the other heavy artillery regiments at Wilderness these men put up a stout defense and Ewell was unable to breakthrough. Lee, worried that Ewell would bring on another battle recalled his men. His army had also taken a beating and was exhausted as well and fighting a third major battle in a month was not something that it could endure easily.
Hancock moved out on May 20 and Lee did not take the bait but did follow on a parallel road toward the North Anna River. The campaign would continue since Grant had resolved to fight it out all summer if necessary and he intended to do so.
Like the the Wilderness the casualty totals vary. Union casualties are placed somewhere around 18,000 men with the Confederates between 10,000 and 12,000. Considering the Grant also lost about 20,000 men who went home when their enlistments expired his army was significantly reduced from where it had been only a month before. Grant though had fresh troops to supplement his ranks. Lee did not and the campaign was taking a toll on his army as well. 43 Union soldiers were awarded the Medal of Honor for their actions at the battle. Today much of the battlefield is preserved as a part of Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park.
