The World Needs More Kevin

Buford engages Heth

A common yarn that was told was that the battle began because Harry Heth needed shoes for his men and wanted to go into Gettysburg to get them. That is false. Jubal Early’s men had been through a few days before and cleaned the town out and Heth knew that, and if Heth didn’t his superior A.P. Hill did. Robert E Lee found out that the Union army was closer at hand than anticipated and needed to concentrate his army, either at Cashtown or Gettysburg. Since he lacked competent cavalry at hand Heth was sent forward in a reconnaissance in force. to scout what was in Gettysburg and its vital road network. His men had encountered Union cavalry the day before and had retreated as ordered. Heth believed that at worst it was an advanced scouting party and he could brush them aside easily but he was under orders not to bring on a general engagement. Whoops.

That Union cavalry was under the command of John Buford, one of the most competent Union cavalry commanders of the war. Heth believed that it was only an advanced party but Buford was here in force, two brigades of about 2,500 men (minus one out of every four men who had to hold the horses) and one battery of artillery. Buford recognized that the terrain near Gettysburg was good defensive ground and he also knew that Union infantry was nearby. If he could just hold long enough the infantry could arrive.

Union infantry arrives

Cavalry could not do much more than be annoying to infantry and Buford knew this. He traded space for time but as the morning wore on that time was nearly up. John Reynolds I Corps was down at Fairplay and would arrive mid-morning with Oliver Howard’s XI Corps in Emmittsburg, Maryland. Just has Heth’s men pushed Buford’s back to what became known as The Swale Union infantry began arriving on the field. Joe Davis’ Mississipians were able to push some of that infantry back but became caught in the Railroad Cut and several of his men surrendered. On the other side of the Chambersburg Pike the Union Iron Brigade moved in and pushed James Archer’s Brigade back. Archer was captured, the first Confederate general officer to be captured under Lee’s command. Reynolds though was killed as he deployed the Iron Brigade, the highest ranking Union officer to be killed up to that point in the war. Knowing he may be biting off more than he can chew Heth pulled back and brought up his artillery.

Race to Oak Hill

A lull settled over the field but both sides continued to have more men arrive on the field. Dorsey Pender’s Division followed Heth along the Chambersburg Pike but the most important arrival was Robert Rodes’ on Oak Hill. Oak Hill is the largest hill on the first day’s field and provides for a spectacular panorama. For the Confederates it would be a valuable artillery platform placed perfectly on the Union flank. Unfortunately for the Union they simply did not have the men in place to take it and hold it when Rodes’ arrived around noon. Rodes saw what he believed was the flank of the Union army near Sheads’ Woods and decided to strike. Edward O’Neil’s Alabamians were turned back by Oliver Howard’s XI Corps which had just arrived. Alfred Iverson’s North Carolinians did not see the Union troops hidden behind a wall and walked right into an ambush through the Forney Farm and were shot down before they knew what hit them. Junius Daniel’s North Carolinians had more success but could not dislodge Union troops from the McPherson Farm.

Collapse of the XI Corps

Lee had ordered a concentration at either Cashtown or Gettysburg and Richard Ewell, the man who had replaced Stonewall Jackson, had moved his men toward Gettysburg when he was informed that Heth was to advance on Gettysburg. The Union XI Corps had taken position along the plain north of town but one of their generals, Francis Barlow, did not like his position and was bothered by a large hill to his front. He believed that if the Confederates got artillery on that knoll they would bombard his men into oblivion. So, on his own authority, he advanced his men to the knoll that now bears his name. The other division in line, Carl Schurz’s was forced to extend their line to keep a connection, stretching it to the breaking point. Around 2:30 in the afternoon Jubal Early’s Division began arriving down the Heidlersburg Road and hit Barlow in the flank. On the other end George Doles’ Brigade from Rodes’ Division hit the other. The XI Corps collapsed but soldiers here and there staged a fighting retreat through the town.

Retreat through the town

With the XI Corps in flight the I Corps’ position was now compromised.  Lee ordered his entire force on the field to attack. Heth and Dorsey Pender drove the I Corps out of the Herbst Woods after a brutal slugfest. The 24th Michigan lost 370 of its 480 men and the 26th North Carolina lost approximately 700 of its nearly 1000 men. Oliver Howard, who was in command, ordered a retreat back to Cemetery Hill but Abner Doubleday, who commanded I Corps, did not know where that was and thought he meant Seminary Hill to his men pulled back to Seminary Ridge instead. Pender moved his men to assault it and his men found a hole in the line. The I Corps was now in retreat.

Howard had recognized that Cemetery Hill was an ideal defensive position and left one of his divisions occupying the hill along with some of his artillery. To stave off a potential disaster he moved some of these men into town to slow the Confederates. A brief fight ensued in Kuhn’s Brickyard before these men were forced into retreat.

Hancock arrives

George Meade, who had been in command of the Army of the Potomac for all of three days, had the decision of his career to make. He wanted to fight near Westminster, Maryland on Parr’s Ridge. His engineers were preparing the position for battle but his most trusted subordinate had been engaged at Gettysburg and he was receiving reports that the terrain there would be an ideal position. On hearing that Reynolds was dead he sent the nearest corps commander available to him, Winfield Hancock. Like Meade, Hancock was from near Philadelphia and had a reputation as one of the Union’s best combat commanders. Meade trusted him and sent him to Gettysburg to report back with a recommendation and to take charge is necessary. Hancock arrived amidst pandemonium and set about restoring order. Many soldiers found him a calming influence but the Union position was vulnerable at this time, but not for long. Henry Slocum’s XII Corps was also beginning to arrive on the field but for about an hour the Confederates had an opportunity to take the position.

A wasted opportunity?

It is perhaps the most controversial moment of the battle. The mythologized Stonewall Jackson would have taken the hill had he been alive of course. After driving the Union from the north and west of town there was chaos. Units were intermingled, some were to use the modern term combat ineffective, others were low on ammunition and some were downright exhausted. Richard Ewell still had daylight, several hours of it, and he had a beaten and disrupted opponent just waiting to be attacked. First though he had to sort his divisions out and get them into line. His men were going from house to house rooting out Union soldiers in hiding, something that would take time and would require guards. He looked for an artillery platform to place his batteries, there was none available, at least not one that was not dominated by the Union batteries on Cemetery Hill. He asked A.P. Hill if he could move some of his artillery up and help with a diversion. Hill, in Lee’s presence, declined. His men were too fought out, despite the fact that a fresh division, Richard Anderson’s, had arrived on the field. Ewell probably took one look at Cemetery Hill and the number of Union batteries there and decided not to make the assault. His orders after all were to assault the hill if practicable but to avoid a general engagement until all of the army was up. Ewell did not believe he could do it and so he didn’t.

Meade makes a decision

Hancock reported that Gettysburg was the place the army should make a stand and sent the report to Meade. On its receipt Meade ordered the ordnance wagons to begin moving to Gettysburg and set out for the place himself sending orders to his other corps commanders to move there.

Despite being defeated on July 1 the Union army found itself in a stronger position with fresh troops arriving by the hour. Lee had been drawn into a battle that he did not want to fight but had emerged victorious. He believed that his men could defeat any foe and now that the battle was on he would continue the fight as long as Meade remained. His goal was to defeat the Union army north of Washington. Lee anticipated that he could bring nearly his whole army to bear on what he expected to be an isolated part of the Union army the next day and destroy it in pieces and he may very well have anticipated that Meade would withdraw overnight. He had won a victory north of the Mason-Dixon line but not a decisive victory and his men were confident and well fed. What could go wrong?